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I. INTRODUCTION 
Every day millions of individuals worldwide depend on the Global 
Positioning System (GPS) to provide location, timing, and navigational 
services.1  While GPS provides many significant benefits to society, the 
scope and detail of the information that law enforcement can collect using 
GPS creates individual privacy risks because its use may impinge on 
individuals’ Fourth Amendment rights to be free from search and seizures.2 
Law enforcement officials describe GPS devices as an efficient, safe, 
and accurate way to track vehicle movement and laud the quality of 
information the devices gather.3  The information law enforcement officials 
collect using GPS tracking devices creates a highly credible and permanent 
record of evidence for criminal prosecutions.4  Furthermore, as the cost of 
GPS use becomes more affordable, law enforcement agencies will use GPS 
more frequently.5 
Despite the growing use of GPS in law enforcement investigations, few 
laws restrict the government’s use of GPS tracking.6  The Supreme Court 
has yet to examine the constitutionality of governmental use of GPS 
                                                          
 1. See Global Positioning System: Serving the World, GPS.GOV, 
http://www.gps.gov/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2011) (indentifying what constitutes the 
global positioning system). 
 2. See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 221 (Wash. 2003) (showing that the 
use of GPS technology allowed law enforcement to locate the body of a missing child); 
Robert Galvin, Bomb Reconstruction Training: Post-Blast Practice, 37 L. 
ENFORCEMENT TECH. 52, 54-59 (2010) (explaining that GPS technology allows police 
officers to better provide evidence to a jury); Richard Winton, LAPD Pursues High-
Tech End to High-Speed Chases, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2006, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2006/feb/03/local/me-bratton3 (noting the LAPD’s use of 
GPS dart guns to track automobiles as an alternative to high-speed chases). 
 3. See Keith Hodges, Tracking “Bad Guys”: Legal Considerations in Using GPS, 
76 FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL. 25, 25 (2007) (detailing how GPS devices benefit law 
enforcement). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2006) (excluding GPS surveillance from privacy 
protection in the statute); see also Hodges, supra note 3, at 26 (elaborating on the lack 
of protections afforded by federal statutes and the resulting benefits to law 
enforcement). 
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devices under the Fourth Amendment.7 The United States Congress has 
also refrained from limiting law enforcement’s investigatory uses of GPS 
devices.8 
In United States v. Maynard, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia held that police use of GPS tracking devices without a 
warrant is an unconstitutional search.9  The Maynard decision differed 
from other circuit court decisions in which courts held that warrantless 
police use of GPS devices did not constitute a search.10  Maynard’s holding 
is significant because it established the rule that the police use of GPS 
devices is a search and, therefore, implicates Fourth Amendment 
protections.11  As GPS technology raises important Fourth Amendment 
concerns, the Supreme Court will likely clarify the constitutionality of law 
enforcement’s GPS use. 12 
GPS devices involve evolving technology within our modern society.13  
The unresolved question is whether privacy law can keep up with this 
technological advancement.14 
                                                          
 7. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 283-84 (1983) (noting that the Court 
left open the question of comprehensive sustained monitoring in deciding the case);  
see also United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 556 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (highlighting 
the Supreme Court’s distinction between a discrete and limited search such as a beeper 
and sustained monitoring or “mass surveillance”), cert. granted sub nom. United States 
v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (June 27, 2011) (No. 10-1259). 
 8. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2006) (specifically excluding “any communication from 
a tracking device” from the privacy protections afforded by the act). 
 9. See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563 (declaring the police search unreasonable and in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment). 
 10. See, e.g., id. at 558 (holding that the warrantless use of GPS by the police 
constituted a search); United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1217 (9th Cir. 
2010) (ruling that the police did not conduct an impermissible search of the defendant’s 
car by monitoring his location with mobile tracking devices); United States v. 
Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 610 (8th Cir. 2010) (finding the  GPS installation reasonable 
because it was not random, arbitrary, invasive, and did not track private places); United 
States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 997 (7th Cir. 2007) (ruling that using GPS is the 
equivalent to following a car and is not a search). 
 11. See Charlie Savage, Judges Divide over Rising GPS Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 14, 2010, at A12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/14/us/14gps.html 
(noting that the issue is whether warrantless GPS tracking violates the Fourth 
Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches). 
 12. See H.W. PERRY JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED 
STATES SUPREME COURT 251 (1991) (“A circuit split is not simply a formal criterion 
for cert.; it is probably the single most important criterion . . . .”); see also Spencer S. 
Hsu, Appeals Court Limits Use of GPS to Track Suspects, WASH. POST, Aug. 7, 2010, 
at A4, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/08/06/AR2010080604946.html (proclaiming that the D.C. 
Circuit opinion has cleared the way for Supreme Court review of the issue of 
warrantless GPS tracking for an extended period of time). 
 13. See Global Positioning System: Serving the World, GPS.GOV, 
http://www.gps.gov/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2011) (noting the vast uses of GPS). 
 14. See, e.g., Renée McDonald Hutchins, Tied Up In Knotts? GPS Technology and 
the Fourth Amendment, 55 UCLA L. REV. 409, 411-13 (2007) [hereinafter Tied up in 
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Part II of this comment examines the Supreme Court’s privacy 
framework that controlled the decisions of the circuit courts and illuminates 
the divided nature of both state and federal courts on the issue of 
warrantless GPS tracking.15  Part III argues that United States v. Knotts 
should not be controlling in cases of continuous and prolonged GPS 
monitoring.16  Part III further contends that the D.C. Circuit Court’s use of 
the “mosaic theory” presents a new workable theory for Fourth 
Amendment analysis.17  This Comment finally considers the policy 
implications of evolving technology and the Fourth Amendment with a 
focus on the disparate impact of the issue on Muslim Americans.18 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Supreme Court and the Evolution of Privacy Jurisprudence 
Several significant Supreme Court decisions specifically address the 
issue of technology and its implications for an individual’s Fourth 
Amendment right to privacy.19  Katz v. United States articulated the two-
part standard for a reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth 
Amendment stating that an individual must have a subjective expectation 
of privacy that society finds reasonable.20  The decision also establishes 
that what an individual seeks to preserve as private, even in a public area, 
may have constitutional protections.21  Courts have used this standard to 
                                                          
Knotts?] (explaining the status of the Fourth Amendment interpretations and evolving 
technology). 
 15. See infra Part II (framing the Supreme Court’s privacy jurisprudence and 
noting the lower courts review of GPS tracking). 
 16. See infra Part III.A (arguing that the Supreme Court specifically excluded 
prolonged monitoring from the issues decided in Knotts, making the case an unsuitable 
precedent). 
 17. See infra Part III.B (arguing that the mosaic theory, which postulates that 
discrete pieces of information when combined together, adopt a new significance based 
on the collective picture the information presents, is a workable test in examining 
evolving technology and privacy). 
 18. See infra Part IV (noting the current issues related to government GPS use and 
Muslim Americans). 
 19. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35 (2001) (holding that information 
obtained by thermal imaging of a suspect’s home constituted a search); United States v. 
Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (deciding that police use of a beeper on a drum in a 
suspect’s vehicle was not a search as there was no reasonable expectation of privacy); 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (delineating 
the required elements to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy). 
 20. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (comparing how people have 
a subjective expectation of privacy for a conversation in their home but not outside the 
home where others can overhear). 
 21. See id. at 351 (reiterating that the Fourth Amendment protects people, not 
places, and that “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own 
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.  But what he seeks to 
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analyze subsequent privacy jurisprudence.22 
Another seminal Supreme Court decision on the nature of privacy came 
in United States v. Knotts.23  In Knotts, police planted a beeper in a 
container of chemicals before the suspect purchased the container and 
placed it in his vehicle.24  The police used the beeper to trace the vehicle to 
a cabin owned by one of the suspects and obtained a warrant to search the 
premises.25  The Court focused on the diminished expectation of privacy in 
a vehicle that travels on public roadways and found that the beeper 
surveillance was not a search.26  In Knotts, the suspect’s argument centered 
on the police monitoring, and not on the installation of the beeper as a 
search.27 
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of evolving technology and 
privacy again, in Kyllo v. United States.28  In Kyllo, the government 
suspected Kyllo of growing marijuana in his home and used a thermal 
imaging device from outside Kyllo’s home to detect radiation from the 
marijuana cultivation lamps.29  The Court held that because the device was 
not in general public use and because the search explored details of the 
home that were previously unknowable without intrusion, the act 
constituted a search that required a warrant.30 
                                                          
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally 
protected.”). 
 22. See, e.g., Knotts, 460 U.S. at 280 (accepting the Court’s holding in Katz as 
controlling). 
 23. Id. at 281 (finding that a person has a diminished expectation of privacy in his 
vehicle and the use of a beeper to follow the person does not change that expectation). 
 24. See id. at 277-78 (explaining that police used a radio transmitter beeper without 
a warrant and without the consent of the suspect to collect locational information). 
 25. See id. at 278-79 (highlighting how the police warrant allowed the police to 
search the cabin, where they found a methamphetamine laboratory that they used to 
convict the suspect). 
 26. See id. at 281, 285 (“A person traveling in an automobile on public 
thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one 
place to another.”). 
 27. See id. at 286 (Brennan, J., concurring) (predicting that the case would have 
been  more difficult to decide had the suspect challenged the beeper’s original 
installation and detailing the holding in Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509-
12 (1961), which finds that if “the government does engage in physical intrusion of a 
constitutionally protected area in order to obtain information, that intrusion may 
constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment even if the same information could 
have been obtained by other means”). 
 28. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (clarifying that the use of a 
thermal heat detector presumptively violated a person’s right to privacy in his home). 
 29. See id. at 29-30 (explaining that evidence from the thermal scan of the home 
provided evidence to procure a warrant which led to Kyllo’s indictment). 
 30. See id. at 40 (instructing that the search was presumptively unreasonable 
without a warrant). 
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B.  Warrantless GPS Tracking and the Lower Courts 
Multiple circuit courts have addressed the issue of warrantless GPS 
tracking.31  Various courts have specifically examined the issue of law 
enforcement’s installation and use of GPS tracking devices on an 
automobile without a warrant in the course of a police investigation.32  The 
court in United States v. Garcia coined the term “wholesale surveillance” 
to refer to the new technologies that might allow law enforcement officials 
an unprecedented ease and scope of surveillance.33  The decision warned 
that advancements in surveillance technology presented considerable 
threats to privacy but stated that the court did not need to resolve that 
momentous issue.34  Recent decisions in United States v. Marquez and 
United States v. Pineda-Moreno represent a similar desire to avoid the 
constitutional scrutiny involved in ruling that a search occurred.35  The 
Marquez decision echoed the concerns over wholesale surveillance, yet the 
court refused to find the warrantless use of the GPS tracker a search.36  The 
decision focused on the non-invasive nature of GPS trackers on an 
automobile, and the fact that police installed the GPS tracker after the 
suspect had parked the vehicle on a public road.37  The court in Pineda-
Moreno also referred to Garcia in finding that the warrantless use of a GPS 
tracking device did not constitute a search.38  In Pineda-Moreno, police 
                                                          
 31. See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 568 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that 
the warrantless use of a GPS tracking device on a suspect’s automobile constituted a 
search and violated the Fourth Amendment), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. 
Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (June 27, 2011) (No. 10-1259); United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 
591 F.3d 1212, 1217 (9th Cir. 2010) (ruling that the warrantless use of a GPS tracking 
device on a suspect’s automobile was not a search); United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 
604, 610 (8th Cir. 2010) (deciding that the warrantless use of a GPS tracking device on 
a suspect’s automobile did not constitute a search); United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 
994, 997-96 (7th Cir. 2007) (resolving that the use of a GPS tracking device on an 
automobile by law enforcement did not constitute a search). 
 32. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 549; Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1213; Marquez, 605 
F.3d at 607; Garcia, 474 F.3d at 995. 
 33. See Garcia, 474 F.3d at 998 (using the term “wholesale surveillance” to explain 
the capabilities of surveillance that new technology offers law enforcement officials). 
 34. See id. (emphasizing the importance of judicial review of wholesale 
surveillance). 
 35. See Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1217 (concluding that monitoring the 
suspect’s automobile with the GPS device was not a law enforcement search); 
Marquez, 605 F.3d at 610 (finding that the GPS device “merely allowed the police to 
reduce the cost of lawful surveillance” and did not constitute a search). 
 36. See Marquez, 605 F.3d at 610 (quoting Garcia, 474 F.3d at 998, and adding 
that as technology advances, law enforcement’s ability to undertake massive and 
possibly arbitrary GPS data collection is a concern). 
 37. See id. (focusing on the public nature of the road to imply that people have 
lower expectations of privacy on the road). 
 38. See Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1216 (quoting Garcia, 474 F.3d at 997) 
(“[F]ollowing a car on a public street . . . is unequivocally not a search within the 
meaning of the amendment.”). 
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officers attached a tracking device while the car was parked in the suspect’s 
driveway.39  The court reasoned that because the suspect did not take steps 
to exclude individuals from his driveway, he did not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the driveway, and the use of the tracking device 
fell short of a search.40 
The D.C. Circuit Court’s decision in Maynard represents a significant 
jurisprudential shift regarding the consideration of GPS tracking as a 
search.41  The court in Maynard rejected the holdings of the other circuit 
courts and held that the police use of GPS tracking constituted a search 
under the Fourth Amendment.42 
In addition to the federal courts, state courts remain divided on the issue 
of governmental use of warrantless GPS tracking.43  State legislatures have 
attempted to create a clear guideline by enacting statutes that impose 
criminal penalties for GPS tracking and mandate the exclusion of GPS data 
evidence obtained without a warrant.44  The disparity in the law at both the 
state and federal levels further increases the likelihood that the Supreme 
Court will review the issue in order to provide greater consistency and 
prevent geographical injustice.45 
                                                          
 39. See id. at 1214 (repeating the suspect’s argument that the police violated his 
privacy when they entered his driveway to access his car). 
 40. See id. at 1215 (proclaiming that the suspect’s lack of active exclusion, such as 
barriers or enclosures, of others from the suspect’s driveway negated his reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the space). 
 41. See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 555-56 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding 
that Knotts is not controlling and the warrantless use of a GPS tracking device on a 
suspect’s automobile was a search that violated the Fourth Amendment), cert. granted 
sub nom. United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (June 27, 2011) (No. 10-1259). 
 42. See id. at 557-58 (rejecting the holdings in Pineda-Moreno, Marquez, and 
Garcia and noting that each court reserved the issue of whether “wholesale” 
surveillance requires a warrant). 
 43. Compare Commonwealth v. Connolly, 913 N.E.2d 356, 369-70 (Mass. 2009) 
(holding that GPS installation constituted a seizure), People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 
1195, 1201 (N.Y. 2009) (requiring a warrant for the installation and use of a GPS 
device in the absence of exigent circumstances), and State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 
221-24 (Wash. 2003) (deciding that the use of a GPS device constituted a search), with 
Osburn v. State, 44 P.3d 523, 526 (Nev. 2002) (determining that GPS tracking did not 
constitute an unreasonable search and seizure), and State v. Sveum, 769 N.W.2d 53, 60 
(Wis. Ct. App. 2009) (concluding that no search occurred when the police used GPS to 
track a vehicle while in public view). 
 44. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 934.31, 934.42 (West 2010) (mandating that 
police acquire a warrant before installing a mobile tracking device); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 626A.35, 626A.37 (West 2010) (requiring a court order for the use of any mobile 
tracking device); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-23a-13, 77-23a-15.5 (LexisNexis 2010) 
(commanding that police acquire a warrant before using a mobile tracking device). 
 45. PERRY, supra note 12, at 250 (stating that Supreme Court review is likely as it 
will be equitable to have a clear Supreme Court ruling instead of conflicting circuit 
court opinions). 
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C.  United States v. Maynard 
1.  Facts 
During the course of a drug investigation, law enforcement officials 
placed a GPS tracking device on Antoine Jones’ Jeep, which tracked Jones’ 
movements twenty-four hours a day for twenty-eight days.46  In the District 
Court, Jones argued that while police had an order for the installation of the 
device, there was a lack of probable cause, the order had expired before 
police installed the device, and the police attached the device outside of the 
issuing court’s jurisdiction.47  The District Court held that the government 
was not required to obtain a court order or a search warrant to install a GPS 
device on a vehicle.48  The District Court suppressed the GPS data that 
police collected while Jones’ car remained in his garage.49  The District 
Court convicted Antoine Jones and Lawrence Maynard of conspiracy to 
distribute and to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of 
cocaine and fifty grams or more of cocaine base.50 
2. Opinion 
The Circuit Court consolidated the appeals of Maynard and Jones, and 
after finding that none of the joint issues warranted reversal, focused on 
Jones’ individual argument.51  The court rejected the government’s 
contention that Knotts was controlling, specifically pointing to the Supreme 
Court’s distinction between the limited information collected by a beeper 
during a single discrete journey, and more comprehensive sustained 
monitoring.52  The Circuit Court applied a Katz analysis and determined 
that unlike movement in a single journey, the totality of an individual’s 
movements over the period of a month is not actually exposed to the 
                                                          
 46. United States v. Jones, 451 F. Supp. 2d 71, 74 (D.D.C. 2006), aff’d in part and 
rev’d in part sub nom. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. 
granted sub nom. United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (June 27, 2011) (No. 10-
1259); see also Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562 & n.* (detailing how the continuous 
surveillance discovered the totality and pattern of Jones’ movements for the month). 
 47. See Jones, 451 F. Supp. 2d 71 (noting that the Government contended that even 
if it did not issue a warrant, Jones had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
vehicle that would prevent the installation of the GPS device). 
 48. See id. (referring to the holding in United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 715 
(1984), where the Supreme Court excluded evidence that police collected while the 
beeper was in a private residence because of the reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the home). 
 49. See id. 
 50. See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 548. 
 51. See id. at 549. 
 52. See id. at 555-56 (emphasizing the Supreme Court’s reservation of whether a 
warrant would be required in the case of twenty four hour surveillance or “drag-net” 
surveillance and noting the single 100-mile trip involved in Knotts). 
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public, because the chance of anyone observing all of the movements is 
extremely unlikely.53 
The court also applied the mosaic theory, which posits that discrete 
pieces of information when combined together, adopt a new significance 
based on the collective picture the information presents.54  In applying this 
theory of information, the court held that an individual does not 
constructively expose the whole of his or her movements.55 
The government typically advances the mosaic theory in Freedom of 
Information Act cases.56  This theory has increased in prominence since the 
September 11, 2001 attacks.57  The D.C. Circuit Court used the mosaic 
theory to justify an individual’s expectation of privacy in his or her 
continuous and prolonged movements.58  This theory provides an 
interesting option in addressing the current dilemma that courts face in 
attempting to reconcile Fourth Amendment interests with evolving 
technology.59 
The D.C. Circuit Court determined that society recognized Jones’ 
expectation of privacy in all of his movements over the course of a month, 
and that utilizing a GPS device without a warrant in order to monitor his 
movements defeated his reasonable expectation of privacy.60  The court 
reversed Jones’ conviction because the court found that the police procured 
                                                          
 53. Id. at 560. 
 54. See United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1318 (4th Cir. 1972) (defining 
the mosaic theory by stating that “[t]he significance of one item of information may 
frequently depend upon knowledge of many other items of information. What may 
seem trivial to the uninformed, may appear of great moment to one who has a broad 
view of the scene and may put the questioned item of information in its proper 
context.”). 
 55. See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562 (“The difference is not one of degree but of kind, 
for no single journey reveals the habits and patterns that mark the distinction between a 
day in the life and a way of life . . . .”). 
 56. See David E. Pozen, The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the Freedom 
of Information Act, 115 YALE L.J. 628, 630 (2005) (outlining the history of the 
government’s use of the mosaic theory). 
 57. See id. at 631 (explaining that while not all courts have sanctioned the mosaic 
theory, several high profile rulings have used the mosaic theory to sustain government 
secrecy). 
 58. See also Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562-63 (using the mosaic theory to find that 
prolonged surveillance implicates privacy in a way that discrete surveillance does not). 
 59. See generally Julian Sanchez, GPS Tracking and a “Mosaic Theory” of 
Government Searches, CATO @ LIBERTY (Aug. 11, 2010, 9:22 PM), http://www.cato-
at-liberty.org/gps-tracking-and-a-mosaic-theory-of-government-searches/ 
(acknowledging that judges could use the mosaic theory to address the issue of 
technology and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence). 
 60. See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563 (“A person does not leave his privacy behind 
when he walks out his front door” and that the application of Katz leads to the 
conclusion that society recognizes the privacy in an individual’s total movements in a 
month). 
9
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evidence in violation of the Fourth Amendment.61 
Following the release of the decision, the prosecution petitioned for a 
rehearing en banc in the D.C. Circuit Court, which the court denied.62  The 
case was further appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which 
granted certiorari.63 
 
III.  ANALYSIS 
A.  The Supreme Court Should Use Jones to Examine the Issue It Reserved 
in Knotts and Affirm the D.C. Circuit Court’s Decision That Knotts Does 
Not Control In Cases Involving Comprehensive and Sustained 
Surveillance. 
The Court in Knotts specifically reserved the issue of twenty-four hour 
or “dragnet” surveillance when it examined the Fourth Amendment 
implications of warrantless police use of a beeper.64  Subsequent lower 
court decisions relied on Knotts to uphold warrantless prolonged GPS 
surveillance even though the Court had limited its holding to exclude this 
type of surveillance.65  These decisions distinguished wholesale 
surveillance, which the Seventh Circuit described as police using GPS to 
track thousands of cars at random, from prolonged surveillance of an 
individual.66  In Maynard, the court noted that the Supreme Court decision 
in Knotts clearly referred to prolonged surveillance of an individual as the 
Court was responding to the defendant’s argument regarding surveillance 
of an individual.67  The Court’s language in Knotts indicates that the Court 
                                                          
 61. Id. at 568. 
 62. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), reh’g en banc 
denied, 625 F.3d 766 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (denying the petition for a rehearing en banc in a 
5 to 4 vote). 
 63. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. granted sub 
nom. United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (June 27, 2011) (No. 10-1259). 
 64. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1983) (“[I]f such dragnet type 
law enforcement practices as respondent envisions should eventually occur, there will 
be time enough then to determine whether different constitutional principles may be 
applicable.”). 
 65. See, e.g., United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 609 (8th Cir. 2010) (using 
Knotts to reason that an automobile traveling from one place to another has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy); United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 
1216-17 (9th Cir. 2010) (relying on Knotts to hold that the use of a GPS device did not 
constitute an impermissible search); United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 996 (7th 
Cir. 2007) (noting that the Court in Knotts held that use of a beeper was not a search). 
 66. See Garcia, 474 F.3d at 998; see also Maynard, 615 F.3d at 557 (outlining that 
the circuit courts had misinterpreted the question reserved in Knotts as only applying to 
mass surveillance). 
 67. See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 556 (describing the defendant’s argument that 
“twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen of this country will be possible, without 
10
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reserved the issue of prolonged individual surveillance for the future.  This 
makes Knotts unacceptable precedent for questions involving the 
warrantless and continuous GPS tracking of individuals.68 
Knotts also signifies that persons traveling on public roads in their 
vehicles lack a reasonable expectation of privacy in their movements from 
one location to another.69  This case indicates that a person lacks a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in discrete trips, such as a single trip; 
however this case does not indicate that individuals lack a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the totality of their movements.70  The police in 
Maynard used GPS technology to track Jones’ movements continuously for 
a month, not simply from one location to another.71  Consequently, the rule 
derived in Knotts did not apply and should not control cases of prolonged 
GPS monitoring because the rule implicates a discrete trip rather than 
prolonged monitoring.72 
GPS devices are considerably more intrusive than the beeper used in 
Knotts and warrant independent judicial privacy analysis.73  When law 
enforcement investigators use beepers, they must use visual surveillance, 
beepers, or sense-augmenting equipment in order to track the suspect.74  
Beepers malfunction in inclement weather and require immense financial 
and manpower investment.75  GPS devices, on the other hand, provide a 
minute-by-minute record of surveillance, can be used in any weather 
condition, are not labor-intensive or expensive for police to use, and do not 
require constant visual surveillance to track a signal.76  Knotts involved the 
use of significantly less invasive technology, and therefore should not 
control cases involving GPS devices as the use of GPS devices allows for 
prolonged and highly intimate intrusions into individuals’ privacy.77 
                                                          
judicial knowledge or supervision.”). 
 68. See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 283-84 (reserving the issue of twenty-four hour 
surveillance of an individual and not mass or wholesale surveillance); Maynard, 615 
F.3d at 557-58 (urging that Knotts is not controlling in cases of prolonged warrantless 
surveillance of an individual). 
 69. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281. 
 70. See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 557 (rejecting the government’s argument that 
Knotts refers to any and all movement of a vehicle in public). 
 71. See id. at 558. 
 72. See id. at 556-57 (explaining that the roughly hundred-mile journey in Knotts is 
critically different from highly invasive prolonged monitoring). 
 73. See Brief for Appellants at 53-68, United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 
(D.C. Cir. 2010) (No. 08-3030), 2009 WL 3155141, at *39-47. 
 74. Id. at *41 (classifying the capabilities of the beeper discussed in Knotts and the 
GPS device at issue in Maynard). 
 75. Id. 
 76. See id. at *56-58 (explaining the superiority of surveillance capability of the 
GPS device compared to a beeper). 
 77. See Tied up in Knotts?, supra note 14, at 453-54 (“To suggest that the 
11
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Maynard presents the opportunity for the Supreme Court to examine the 
issue specifically reserved in Knotts.78  The discrete nature of the 
monitoring and the use of a less advanced surveillance device make Knotts 
an incompatible precedent for cases involving prolonged warrantless GPS 
tracking.79  A Supreme Court affirmation of the holding in Maynard will 
signal to both state and federal courts that Knotts is not precedent in cases 
involving warrantless prolonged monitoring by law enforcement.80 
B. The Supreme Court Should Affirm the D.C. Circuit Court’s Decision 
Because the Warrantless Use of a GPS Tracker Constituted an 
Unreasonable Search as Jones Had a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
in the Whole of His Movements over a Month, and Society is Willing to 
Accept This Expectation as Reasonable. 
Supreme Court privacy jurisprudence dictates that courts undertake a 
Katz analysis to determine whether a search was reasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment.81  The two-prong test dictates that Fourth Amendment 
protections apply when an individual has both an objectively and 
subjectively reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her actions.82  The 
D.C. Circuit Court used the mosaic theory to establish that Jones had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his aggregated whereabouts for the 
month that he was under surveillance.83  The court then turned to the 
second prong of the Katz test and relied on state law trends and specific 
state cases to find an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy.84  The 
                                                          
unfettered use of GPS-enabled tracking is contemplated by the Court’s decisions in 
Katz and Knotts ignores this critical element of Fourth Amendment analysis.”). 
 78. Cf. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 556-57 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (noting 
the Supreme Court’s reservation of the issue of prolonged monitoring in Knotts), cert. 
granted sub nom. United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (June 27, 2011) (No. 10-
1259). 
 79. See id. at 556-58 (holding that Knotts applies to cases involving discrete 
monitoring and not to cases involving wholesale surveillance); Brief for Appellants at 
56-58, United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (No. 08-3030), 2009 
WL 3155141 at *56-58 (comparing the superior technological capabilities of a GPS 
device to a beeper). 
 80. Cf. Savage, supra note 11 (hypothesizing a Supreme Court review of Maynard 
due to the contradicting decisions of lower courts). 
 81. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) 
(creating the two-part test for reasonableness of an expectation of privacy in terms of 
Fourth Amendment protections). 
 82. Id. 
 83. See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562-63 (using the mosaic theory to conclude that 
collective movements reveal more than discrete trips and that an individual has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in their collective movements). 
 84. See id. at 563-64 (holding that the action of the state legislatures, specific state 
cases, and the highly invasive nature of a GPS search indicate that society would be 
willing to recognize Jones’ expectation of privacy in his collective movements as 
reasonable). 
12
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presence of an objectively and subjectively reasonable expectation of 
privacy implicated Fourth Amendment protections and required the court to 
reverse Jones’ conviction as the GPS tracking constituted an unreasonable 
search.85 
1.  The D.C. Circuit Court Correctly Held That Jones Had a Reasonable 
Expectation of Privacy in the Whole of His Movements over a Month 
Because His Movements Were Not Exposed to the Public in Light of the 
Mosaic Theory. 
The D.C. Circuit Court correctly held that Jones had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the totality of his movements twenty-four hours a 
day for twenty-eight days.86  Maynard expressly presents the issue of 
whether wholesale surveillance of an individual requires a warrant.87  The 
court successfully used the mosaic theory to establish that Jones had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy from such surveillance.88 
The first prong of the Katz test addresses whether an individual has 
exposed information to the public and what that individual can reasonably 
expect others to do with that information.89  Jones’ movements in his 
vehicle may have been on public roads, but the likelihood that another 
individual would observe all of his movements is effectively nil.90  
Maynard is consistent with Supreme Court precedent because, while an 
individual may be able to gather the information, the fact that a reasonable 
person would not expect another to record his collective and prolonged 
movements preserves the expectation of privacy.91 
The Supreme Court has previously reviewed and upheld government use 
of the mosaic theory to protect collective information.92  While the 
                                                          
 85. See id. at 568 (recognizing that without the evidence obtained through 
warrantless police use of GPS data, the evidence was insufficient). 
 86. See id. at 558 (differentiating the recording of the totality of one’s movements 
from piecemeal tracking). 
 87. See id. at 557-58 (distinguishing other circuit courts that have preserved the 
constitutional limits to GPS tracking). 
 88. See id. at 562 (justifying a reasonable expectation of privacy in collective 
movements under the mosaic theory). 
 89. See United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (explaining that a 
reasonable expectation of privacy depends on the degree to which an individual 
exposes information to the public). 
 90. See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 559-60 (describing that Jones did not actually expose 
his movements to the public). 
 91. Compare Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 344, 338-39 (2000) (holding that a 
bus passenger has a reasonable expectation that his bag will not be felt in an 
exploratory manner, even though the bag is in a public space), with Maynard, 615 F.3d 
at 560 (contending that an individual has a reasonable expectation that his prolonged 
and continuous movements, while they may be in a public area, will not be observed). 
 92. See Christina E. Wells, CIA v. Sims: Mosaic Theory & Government Attitude, 58 
ADMIN. L. REV.  845, 851-52 (2006) (explaining that the decision in CIA v. Sims, 471 
13
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government originally used the mosaic theory to defeat the rationale for the 
Freedom of Information Act, it has expanded the use of the theory to justify 
closing deportation hearings, indefinitely detaining non-citizens, and 
searching certain records.93  Judges have extended extreme deference to the 
government in many instances when the government has asserted the 
mosaic theory as a justification for intelligence secrecy.94  Scholars note 
that even though the government often provides little evidence in support 
of the mosaic theory aside from vague national security claims, judges 
frequently side with the government for fear of “unknown 
vulnerabilities.”95  Mosaic theory cases emphasize the critical value of 
collective information and evidence a judicial fear of discrete pieces of 
information compromising the collective.96 
The fear of the unknown value of collective information should also 
protect an individual’s fundamental right to privacy from highly intrusive 
government searches.97 Just as judges refused to allow the diffusion of 
discrete pieces of information in the name of unknown national security 
interests, they should also protect the value of an individual’s collective 
information.98  Individual privacy, like national security, is a critical aspect 
of free society and warrants heightened protection for collective 
information.99 
The mosaic theory of information aligns real world expectations about 
privacy with the rule of law.100  GPS technology enables law enforcement 
to conduct surveillance that would be too expensive to collect using other 
                                                          
U.S. 159 (1985), constituted the Supreme Court’s acceptance of the mosaic theory to 
protect government information). 
 93. See id. at 869-70 (describing the broad scope of activities in which the 
government invokes the mosaic theory to keep activities private). 
 94. See id. at 852-55 (arguing that judges, fearing national security implications, 
showed extreme deference to the government in allowing it to protect non-classified 
information). 
 95. See Pozen, supra note 56, at 653-54 (suggesting that judges protect the 
government). 
 96. See, e.g., Halperin v. CIA, 629 F.2d 144, 150 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (“We must take 
into account, however, that each individual piece of intelligence information, much like 
a piece of jigsaw puzzle, may aid in piecing together other bits of information even 
when the individual piece is not of obvious importance in itself.”). 
 97. Cf. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (using the 
mosaic theory to protect an individual’s expectation of privacy in his collective 
movements from unwarranted police surveillance), cert. granted sub nom. United 
States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (June 27, 2011) (No. 10-1259). 
 98. See, e.g., Halperin, 629 F.2d at 150 (justifying the protection of CIA legal bills 
under the theory that someone could combine them with other discrete information to 
uncover covert CIA transactions). 
 99. Id. 
 100. See Sanchez, supra note 59 (positing that the mosaic theory of information and 
privacy is preferable to an analysis which assumes that the sum of “public” facts must 
always be itself a public fact). 
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methods.101  The massive amounts of data accumulated by GPS devices, 
when viewed collectively, provides a highly detailed profile of an 
individual, including not only where he or she goes, but also his or her 
political, religious, professional, and romantic associations.102  An 
individual reasonably expects his or her movements to be disconnected and 
anonymous, and the intimate portrait of his or her life that police are able to 
compile through continuous monitoring, undermines that reasonable 
expectation of privacy.103 
The mosaic theory is a novel theory in the Fourth Amendment context 
and it could dramatically change privacy jurisprudence.104  Legal scholars 
have been promoting the mosaic theory, which some refer to as the 
“aggregation effect,” as a new way to think about personal information in 
the digital age.105  The flexibility of the mosaic theory provides advantages 
to courts because the test can adapt to evolving technology in a way that 
other tests would be unable to do.106 
The significant strength of the theory is also its biggest weakness: judges 
measure a search not by whether a particular individual act is a search but 
by whether the collective conduct amounts to a search.107  This presents 
concern because no bright line rule exists that would distinguish a non-
search from a search when examining data collected by a GPS tracking 
device.108  Maynard differs from Knotts in that Knotts involved a single, 
                                                          
 101. United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 102. See People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 2009) (warning of the 
highly detailed picture that an individual GPS surveillance captures). 
 103. See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (positing 
that continuous tracking reveals more than any individual reasonably expects others to 
know), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (June 27, 2011) 
(No. 10-1259). 
 104. See Orin Kerr, D.C. Circuit Introduces “Mosaic Theory” of Fourth 
Amendment, Holds GPS Monitoring a Fourth Amendment Search, THE VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (Aug. 6, 2010, 2:46 PM), http://volokh.com/2010/08/06/d-c-circuit-
introduces-mosaic-theory-of-fourth-amendment-holds-gps-monitoring-a-fourth-
amendment-search/ (suggesting that examining the Fourth Amendment in light of 
collective activity would change Fourth Amendment analysis). 
 105. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN 
THE DIGITAL AGE 44 (2004) (detailing the “aggregation effect,” which explains that 
“[i]nformation that appears innocuous can sometimes be the missing link . . . or the key 
necessary to unlock other stores of personal information.”). 
 106. See Sanchez, supra note 59 (“[E]specially as technology makes such 
aggregative monitoring more of a live concern—some kind of shift to a ‘mosaic’ view 
of privacy is going to be necessary to preserve the practical guarantees of the Fourth 
Amendment, just as in the twentieth century a shift from a wholly property-centric to a 
more expectations-based theory was needed to prevent remote sensing technologies 
from gutting its protections.”). 
 107. See id. (noting the lack of a specific rule that would distinguish non-searches 
from searches). 
 108. See id. (contemplating the absence of a boundary for the scope and duration of 
activity which would constitute a search requiring judicial approval from that which 
15
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discrete trip where Maynard involved prolonged monitoring.109  The court 
neglected to articulate the bright line between a single discrete trip and a 
month of continuous monitoring.110 
The mosaic theory supports Jones’ reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the totality of his movements for the month during which he was under 
warrantless surveillance.111  While the mosaic theory is not without flaws, 
further judicial development of the theory’s Fourth Amendment 
implications will likely resolve these issues.112  The flexibility of the 
mosaic theory provides a standard that is capable of addressing individual 
privacy concerns in the face of rapidly advancing surveillance 
technology.113 
2.  The D.C. Circuit Court Correctly Held That Jones’ Reasonable 
Expectation of Privacy in the Whole of His Movements over the Period of a 
Month is One Which Society is Prepared to Accept as Reasonable, as 
Evidenced by State Legislation and Specific State Cases. 
The D.C. Circuit Court, in examining Maynard under the second prong 
of the Katz test, correctly held that society would recognize Jones’ 
expectation of privacy as reasonable.114  To determine what society is 
willing to accept as reasonable, courts must look to societal norms, the law 
of previous judges, and legislative intent.115  The movement of state 
legislatures towards providing protection from warrantless police use of 
GPS tracking devices is a strong indication of the fact that society agrees 
that this type of intrusion violates an expectation of privacy.116  State court 
                                                          
would not). 
 109. See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 
(differentiating the privacy expectations in a discrete trip compared to the totality of an 
individual’s continuous movements), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Jones, 
131 S. Ct. 3064 (June 27, 2011) (No. 10-1259). 
 110. See Kerr, supra note 104 (“One-month of surveillance is too long, the court 
says. But how about 2 weeks? 1 week? 1 day? 1 hour?”). 
 111. See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562-63 (using the mosaic theory to satisfy the first 
prong of the Katz test and to establish a subjective reasonable expectation of privacy). 
 112. See Sanchez, supra note 59 (addressing the flaws of the mosaic theory but 
positing that the theory remains workable regardless). 
 113. See id. (lauding the flexibility of the mosaic theory in terms of addressing 
privacy concerns of evolving technology). 
 114. See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563-64; see also Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) 
(Harlan, J., concurring) (noting the requirement that society views the privacy 
expectation as reasonable). 
 115. See Peter Winn, Katz and the Origins of the “Reasonable Expectation of 
Privacy” Test, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1, 9 (2008) (discussing how judges determine 
the objective expectation of privacy). 
 116. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23a-15.5 (LexisNexis 2010) (providing that an 
investigative or law enforcement officer needs a court order to install any mobile 
tracking device and stating that the there must be specifically granted authority to 
attach a tracking device to any area in which there exists a reasonable expectation of 
16
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cases also indicate a trend toward judicial acceptance of an objectively 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the totality of individuals’ prolonged 
movements in their automobile.117  Therefore, warrantless GPS monitoring 
defeats an expectation of privacy.118 
Additionally, requiring a warrant for law enforcement use of GPS 
devices is consistent with existing societal norms.119  A recent survey of 
societal privacy concerns relating to location-indicating programs on 
cellular telephones revealed that individuals believed that risks associated 
with the use of such technology outweighed the benefits.120  These results 
indicate society’s unease with the intrusiveness of GPS tracking in public 
and private areas, as well as the fear of government abuse of the 
technology.121 
Applying the mosaic theory to Maynard strengthens the argument that 
society would be willing to accept Jones’ expectation of privacy as 
reasonable.122  Maynard and similar state cases differ from the decisions in 
Garcia, Marquez, and Pineda-Moreno because those decisions did not 
recognize the distinction between discrete and collective information in 
Knotts.123  Societal expectations of privacy will inevitably change based on 
the nature of a prolonged search and the mosaic of an individual that the 
                                                          
privacy). 
 117. See People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1201 (N.Y. 2009) (noting that law 
enforcement must obtain warrants before installing and using GPS devices); 
Commonwealth v. Connolly, 913 N.E.2d 356, 369-70 (Mass. 2009) (holding that GPS 
installation constituted a seizure); State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 221 (Wash. 2003) 
(deciding that using a GPS device amounted to a search). 
 118. See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563 (concluding that an objective expectation of 
privacy exists). 
 119. See Tied up in Knotts?, supra note 14, at 459 (arguing that requiring a warrant 
is consistent with existing norms and the free society envisioned by the Framers). 
 120. See Janice Y. Tsai et al., Location-Sharing Technologies: Privacy Risks and 
Controls, 6 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 119, 138-40, 145 (2010) (revealing that 
perceived risks of location sharing technology outweighed the benefits, such as finding 
individuals in an emergency or tracking missing children). 
 121. See id. at 145 (reporting that individuals in the survey expressed that both a fear 
of being tracked by the government and the overall lack of privacy as harms associated 
with GPS programs in cellular telephones). 
 122. See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563 (warning that “prolonged GPS monitoring 
reveals an intimate picture of the subject’s life that he expects no one to have . . .”). 
 123. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1983) (explicitly reserving the 
issue of prolonged surveillance stating that if such collective surveillance eventually 
occurs, the court may then determine whether alternate constitutional principles apply). 
Compare Maynard, 615 F.3d at 666-56 (recognizing that Knotts was inapplicable 
because it involved limited surveillance), with United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 491 
F.3d 1212, 1216-17 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that under Knotts, surveillance for a 
reasonable period of time was not a search), and People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 
1199 (N.Y. 2009) (“Constant, relentless tracking of anything is now not merely 
possible but entirely practicable, indeed much more practicable than the surveillance 
conduced in Knotts.”). 
17
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collective information creates for law enforcement.124  Citizens do not 
reasonably expect that the government will track their continuous 
whereabouts without a warrant in order to create a highly detailed mosaic 
of their lives.125 
The sociological data, combined with the activity in state court and state 
legislatures, signals society’s fear of warrantless GPS tracking.126  These 
factors indicate that Jones had an objectively reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the totality of his movements for the month he was under 
warrantless surveillance.127  Therefore, warrantless GPS tracking in 
Maynard constituted a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment as 
Jones had a subjectively and objectively reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the totality of his movements for a month.128 
IV.  POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
A Supreme Court affirmation of warrantless police use of GPS tracking 
to create detailed mosaics of individuals will change residents’ relationship 
with the government.129  Recent reports of warrantless government GPS 
tracking confirm the suspicions of the Maynard court.130  Several recent 
stories illuminate how the government’s use of GPS tracking specifically 
targets Muslim-Americans in the wake in 9/11.131 
Yasir Afifi, a U.S. citizen and California resident, with an Egyptian-born 
father, was having his oil changed when his mechanic found a rectangular 
                                                          
 124. See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562 (“The difference is not one of degree but of kind, 
for no single journey reveals the habits and patterns that mark the distinction between a 
day in the life and a way of life.”). 
 125. See Tied up in Knotts?, supra note 14, at 459 (noting that if GPS tracking is 
deemed a non-search then individuals will be forced to assume that the government is 
tracking them at any time). 
 126. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23a-15.5 (LexisNexis 2010) (requiring a court 
order to install a GPS device); Tsai, supra note 120, at 145 (observing individuals’ fear 
of government abuse of GPS). 
 127. See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 564 (using various factors to conclude that society 
would interpret privacy in the totality of an individual’s movements for the period of a 
month as a reasonable). 
 128. See id. at 568 (deciding that the warrantless GPS tracking violated Jones’ 
Fourth Amendment rights). 
 129. See Tied up in Knotts?, supra note 14, at 459 (positing that warrantless GPS 
tracking by the government would significantly alter the current relationship between 
citizens and the government because of the level of intrusion and the privacy interest in 
collective details). 
 130. See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562 (acknowledging the detailed picture, including 
religious and cultural information, that the government obtains by prolonged 
warrantless GPS tracking). 
 131. See, e.g., Mina Kim, FBI’s GPS Tracking Raises Privacy Concerns, NPR (Oct. 
27, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=130833487 (detailing 
two recent GPS tracking incidents in California against Muslim-Americans). 
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device attached to the undercarriage of the automobile.132  Afifi posted 
pictures of the device on an online forum, where posters indicated that it 
was a GPS tracking device.133  Soon after, four armed FBI agents 
approached Afifi, demanding that he return the device as it was federal 
property.134  The FBI confirmed that it had placed the GPS device on 
Afifi’s vehicle, but did not indicate why the government was investigating 
Afifi.135  Comments made by the FBI agents indicated that Afifi was under 
surveillance for three to six months.136 
Abdo Alwareeth, another California resident, claims that a similar 
situation occurred two years ago when he found a GPS device on his 
vehicle while taking an auto-mechanics class.137  Alwareeth, a U.S. citizen 
originally from Yemen, cannot understand why, after forty years living in 
the United States, the government targeted him.138  Alwareeth and his wife 
now live in constant fear of FBI surveillance and check their vehicles daily 
for additional tracking devices.139 
Zahra Billoo, the head of the local chapter of the Council on American-
Islamic Relations, explains that this type of FBI activity creates a rift 
between the government and American-Islamic communities by frightening 
these communities.140  Billoo also reported that two Ohio residents recently 
found similar tracking devices on their vehicles.141 
The most frightening aspect of these incidents is not the actual devices 
found, but the likelihood that the FBI and other law enforcement agencies 
are conducting warrantless GPS surveillance on unsuspecting residents.142  
The opinions of the Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Circuit Courts deny any 
protection to individuals from the government’s warrantless use of GPS 
tracking even in situations such as these where the individuals were 
religiously or ethnically targeted.143  Muslims in the United States face 
                                                          
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Davi Barker, Who Needs a Warrant . . . He’s Muslim!, EXAMINER.COM (Oct. 8, 
2010, 9:23 PM), http://www.examiner.com/muslim-in-san-francisco/who-needs-a-
warrant-he-s-muslim. 
 135. Kim, supra note 131. 
 136. Kim Zetter, Caught Spying on Student, FBI Demands GPS Tracker Back, 
WIRED THREAT LEVEL BLOG (Oct. 7, 2010, 10:13 PM), 
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/10/fbi-tracking-device/. 
 137. Kim, supra note 131. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. See id. (referring to the Islamic American and Arab American communities). 
 141. Zetter, supra note 136. 
 142. Cf. Barker, supra note 134 (asserting that it is highly unusual that Afifi’s device 
was found at all and implying that most GPS devices of this nature will not be found). 
 143. Cf. United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1217 (9th Cir. 2010) 
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growing discrimination in post-9/11 America.144  As the attitude in the 
United States continues to become increasingly negative towards Muslims, 
it is critical that warrants be required in order to prevent “Islamophobia” 
from infiltrating law enforcement practices.145  A Supreme Court 
affirmation of Maynard would provide a basic level of protection for 
Muslim-Americans, as it would require a minimum of probable cause for 
the government to use a GPS tracking device.146 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Individual privacy is a fundamental right and directly involves the ability 
to prevent the collection and circulation of personal information.147  The 
current Supreme Court privacy framework fails to account for the level of 
intrusion occasioned by advanced technology and how its use undermines 
privacy protections.148  Knotts should not control cases involving the 
continuous monitoring with GPS devices, as the case dealt with a discrete 
journey and specifically did not address the issue of prolonged 
surveillance.149  A warrantless police beeper used for a one hundred-mile 
trip and warrantless GPS tracking for a month or more are not equivalent 
                                                          
(holding that the warrantless use of a GPS tracking device on a suspect’s automobile 
was not a search); United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 610 (8th Cir. 2010) 
(deciding that the warrantless use of a GPS tracking device on a suspect’s automobile 
did not constitute a search); United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 996 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(analogizing GPS tracking to surveillance cameras and satellite imaging). 
 144. See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Muslims Report Rising Discrimination at Work, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2010 at B1 (illustrating the rise in reported incidents of 
discrimination against Muslims in the workplace and noting the sixty percent increase 
from 2005 to 2009 in claims). 
 145. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., NYC MOSQUE OPPOSED, MUSLIMS’ RIGHT TO BUILD 
MOSQUES FAVORED: PUBLIC REMAINS CONFLICTED OVER ISLAM (2010), available at 
http://pewforum.org/uploadedFiles/Topics/Religious_Affiliation/Muslim/Islam-
mosque-full-report.pdf (providing statistical support for the assertion that public 
opinion in America has become increasingly unfavorable towards Muslims, even since 
2005); Islamophobia, COUNCIL ON AMERICAN-ISLAMIC RELATIONS, 
http://www.cair.com/Issues/Islamophobia/Islamophobia.aspx (last visited Feb. 17, 
2011) (defining Islamophobia in the United States as the fear of and hostility towards 
Islam which relates to the discriminatory treatment of Muslims). 
 146. See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 568 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that 
Fourth Amendment protections require the government to obtain a warrant before using 
a GPS tracking device), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 
(June 27, 2011) (No. 10-1259). 
 147. See SOLOVE, supra note 105, at 51 (equating the collection of personal 
information without an individual’s knowledge to powerlessness). 
 148. See Renée McDonald Hutchins, The Anatomy of a Search: Intrusiveness and 
the Fourth Amendment, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 1185, 1187-88 (2010) (advocating that the 
Supreme Court modify its privacy analysis to better protect privacy as technology 
evolves). 
 149. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1983) (explicitly reserving the 
issue of mass surveillance for another time). 
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surveillance techniques and implicate separate privacy issues.150  As 
surveillance technology continues to evolve, the Supreme Court must 
reevaluate its reliance on Knotts, and United States v. Jones presents the 
ideal opportunity for the Court to do so.151 
The mosaic theory, while novel as a justification for Fourth Amendment 
protection, provides a practical alternative for privacy analysis that is 
flexible enough to adapt to developing technologies.152  Just as the 
government has successfully used the theory to protect the unknown value 
of collective information, citizens too, should be able to use this rationale 
to protect the unknown value of personal collective information.153  The 
adoption of the mosaic theory and the rejection of warrantless GPS 
searches by police have significant implications for the future of individual 
privacy and technology.154 
For example, built in vehicular GPS systems, which used to be present 
exclusively in luxury car models, are now prevalent in a large variety of 
standard vehicles.155  These built in “concierge systems,” such as OnStar, 
allow police officers to monitor the past and present location of these 
vehicles without installing a tracking device.156  For police, this eliminates 
issues of whether the installation of the tracking device constituted a 
search.157  A Supreme Court decision, allowing warrantless GPS tracking, 
could imply that law enforcement agencies do not need a warrant to collect 
information from built in GPS systems, which some state courts have 
                                                          
 150. See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 556-57 (rejecting Knotts as a controlling case 
because of the differences in technology and the nature of the privacy interest at stake). 
 151. Cf. Tied up in Knotts?, supra note 14, at 453-54 (“Where the sophistication of 
GPS technology permits the pinpoint tracking of persons (not just vehicles), the overly 
broad application of Knotts allows a substantial encroachment upon personal privacy 
that was clearly not envisioned by the Knotts Court.”). 
 152. See Sanchez, supra note 59 (lauding the mosaic theory’s flexibility as opposed 
to the current privacy analysis regime). 
 153. See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562 (utilizing the mosaic theory to find that an 
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the totality of their movements 
over a prolonged period); Pozen, supra note 56, at 653-54 (noting the government’s use 
of the mosaic theory to protect the uncertain value of collective information in secrecy 
cases). 
 154. See Sanchez, supra note 59 (arguing that the mosaic theory of privacy will be 
necessary in order to prevent Fourth Amendment protections from becoming obsolete 
in the face of advancing technology). 
 155. See Donald W. Garland & Carol M. Bast, Is the Government Riding Shotgun? 
Recent Changes in Automobile Technology and the Right to Privacy, 46 CRIM. L. 
BULL. 295 (2010) (opining that technological advances in recent years have lead to 
more cars being built with GPS and concierge systems). 
 156. See id. (arguing that concierge systems in automobiles potentially allow law 
enforcement tracking and eavesdropping capabilities). 
 157. See id. (proposing that because car manufacturers include GPS systems in 
vehicles, individuals would only have the opportunity to contest law enforcement’s use 
of the previously installed GPS devices). 
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already found to be a less invasive procedure.158 
It is likely that the Court’s decision will also impact future court cases 
involving a multitude of location sharing devices such as cellular phones, 
laptops, and other mobile devices.159  The Electronic Communications Act 
governs cell phone tracking and requires law enforcement to obtain a court 
order in order to obtain information about a person’s location.160  Lower 
courts lack a consensus on the issue of whether these orders require 
probable cause or simply an articulable facts standard.161  Supreme Court 
affirmation of the Maynard decision would send a clear signal to law 
enforcement that a warrant is required to use an individual’s technological 
devices to determine his or her location.162 
The Fourth Amendment protects privacy in the relationship between the 
government and citizens.163  While the Court has shifted from a property 
and trespass regime of privacy evaluation, the current conceptualization of 
the Fourth Amendment fails to adapt to technological advances and 
changing society.164  Privacy jurisprudence must evolve to shield 
individuals’ lives and social practices as well as information that relates to 
humans’ basic needs and desires from inappropriate police uses of 
advanced technology.165  The mosaic theory provides a workable option 
that accommodates modern technology and allows adjustments to privacy 
jurisprudence. 
 
                                                          
 158. See id. (explaining that the court, in United States v. Coleman, No. 07-20357, 
2008 WL 495323 (E.D. Mich. 2008), found that the police were not required to install 
an additional tracking device because using the existing built in device was less 
invasive). 
 159. See Adam Koppel, Warranting a Warrant: Fourth Amendment Concerns 
Raised By Law Enforcement’s Warrantless Use of GPS and Cellular Phone Tracking, 
64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1061, 1069 (2010) (noting the need for Fourth Amendment 
guidance in light of the advances in mobile technology, such as cell phones). 
 160. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (2006) (detailing the lawful procedure for intercepting 
electronic communications). 
 161. See Koppel, supra note 159, at 1080-83 (exposing the courts’ inconsistent 
requirements for court orders). 
 162. Cf. id. at 1089 (advocating that the Supreme Court address the issue of the 
warrant requirement in cases of GPS and cellular telephone tracking). 
 163. See SOLOVE, supra note 105, at 191 (referencing Orwell’s and Kafka’s 
propositions that government intrusions into the privacy of an individual prevent 
freedom and well-being). 
 164. See id. at 190 (arguing that while the Court has adjusted the privacy framework 
from a property based philosophy, the current jurisprudence is too narrow to afford the 
larger Fourth Amendment protections). 
 165. See id. at 191 (proposing that privacy must protect individuals’ lives where 
judgment is particularly abrasive and in areas of our basic needs including sexuality, 
entertainment, political activity, and family). 
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